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Liana Theodoratou, A Small History of Statues 
since it must always look forward to what exceeds it, to a future that cannot 
be predicted but which perhaps promises a future that could be otherwise, 
that would not be the continuation of pasts but would, for the first time, 
expose the claim of these pasts to another time - a time other than the time 
of the brutality and cruelty of a dictatorship. This is why this severed hand 
appears in another form in "Portraits of an Ancient Rain", and I would like 
to close my essay with this small poem. Although it was written nearly ten 
years before Ritsos' arrest in 1967, it already brings together nearly all the 
figures with which I have been concerned - blindness, sight, uncertainty, 
pain, and stone - and thereby suggests that the origin of the statue's - and 
thereby poetry's -responsibilities lies in blindness, in what I have referred 
to as the darkness of the lived moment. There, then, in a poem that asks us 
to bear witness to a future, to remain open to it, however uncertain it may 
be, he tells us that the poet holds 
a long, harsh and tender song 
like a magician's wand wishing to transform life 
like a blindman's stick searching for a way to enter the 
world. 
The blindmen's vision concentrates on 
the tip of their walking sticks; the tip ofthe sticks 
is their eyes, deep, familiar with darkness. The blind 
strike their sticks, test the air, the silence, root, and stone, 
they strike their own eyes against every stone and they hurt. 
Where they hurt, they see and know. 
Where they see and know, they point. 
A poem is a stretched finger out in the rain; 
it trembles as it points toward the sun. 
Poets have conquered blindness. 11 
If the poet has conquered blindness, however, it is only because he asks us 
to imagine what the world has never offered us: absolute freedom, justice, 
and equality - not oppression, injustice, and violence. This is why we must 
always, at every moment, invent the world anew, in all our blindness, in the 
midst of a life that is always touched by death. We must invent a world 
instead of being subjected to one, or dreaming of another - we must 
recognise a world where blind statues see and act responsibly toward one 
another, where the mute sing, and where, as in Ritsos' "At the Harbour's 
Edge", "with such obscurities", we may "seek to escape the dark" (SB 45). 
""Portraits of an Ancient Rain", in Yanms R1tsos Selected Poems (1935-1989), trans. George Pilitsis 
(Brookline, MA.: Hellenic College Press, 2001), p. 173. 
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This moral injunction by Nikos Kazantzakis can be found in his brief 
philosophical creed translated as Spiritual Exercises (Kazantzakis, 1960: 
·117), in one of its culminating chapters on "The relationship between Man 
and Man". Unquestionably it stands out as one of the most interesting 
ethical statements contained in the book, expressing almost a complete 
reversal of a substantial tradition of Western moral theory. Since reflection 
on ethics as the study of interpersonal conduct began with the Greeks in an 
·attempt to correlate facts and values, passions were to be understood as 
· negative alterations of the human soul leading to behavioural wrong-doing, 
religious sin or existential inauthenticity. 
The Greeks had a rather ambivalent understanding of how passions 
(pathe) influence consciousness. Passions decentre the self-reflecting 
subject from its own [proper?] goal by making it dependent on external 
objects or the approval of others. Detachment (apatheia and ataraxia) from 
passions can be found at the heart of Platonism, Stoicism and Christianity 
. as the only remedy to the self-consuming excess of emotions that distort 
intellectual reason and moral dignity. In the Oriental traditions also, as 
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stipulated by the Bhagavat Gita and more crucially by Buddhism, passions 
have been perceived as the central expression of ignorance: passions 
confirm the illusory character of existence and distract consciousness from 
its ultimate self-realisation. For most religions or religious philosophies, 
passions are not simply expressions of human irrationalism but also 
indicate the demonic influence of forces beyond human control, and 
inevitably lead to hamartia, that is, the existential failure to follow moral or 
divine law. 
Only in some fringe religious movements has the idea of "redemption 
through sin" as the complete liberation of passions played a key role in 
redefining the relation between the individual psyche and the interpersonal 
world of societal rules. In certain ancient Gnostic sects, "sinning" became 
an empowering force destined to elevate the individual through the totality 
of felt emotion into a state of absolute self-knowledge and an oceanic 
feeling of total fusion with the cosmic continuum. Later in history, within 
Judaism, as in the strange episode of Sabatai Zevi, "lawless heresy" aspired 
to fundamentally transform the whole of creation through "lawlessness, 
antinomianism and catastrophic negation" (Scholem, 1971: 84). In the 
liberation frenzy caused by the Reformation, the Anabaptists of Jan van 
Leyden surrendered to "more violent passions" in order to bring the cosmic 
struggle between good and evil to an end. In modern times, some extreme 
enthusiastic cults led their members through the uncontrolled explosion of 
sexual passions to mass suicide in an attempt to bring about the end of 
history in an apocalyptic rupture of historical time. 
But what did Kazantzakis mean by this statement? Not an extreme 
believer of any kind, but also not untouched by the apocalyptic mania of 
his generation, he tried to articulate a different creed of metaphysical, 
anthropological and cosmological dimensions in which moral behaviour 
and ethical predisposition were not understood in terms of the traditional 
elimination of passions but on the contrary as a constant liberation of 
emotional charge through acts of identification with the absolute negative 
other. Thus, passions lead to the exodus from the individualistic cult of the 
romanticised ego; they become expressions of a problematised relation 
with nature and history, in which the individual searches for a position and 
a topos for self-articulation. Passions indicate the need for a new language 
of differentiation between the self-examining I and the multiplicity of its 
feelings; they are not expressions of the "soul" or of the "ego" but 
negations of its grip over existence. 
Furthermore, the juxtaposition between passion and virtue and more 
specifically between "neutral virtue" and "violent passions" expresses a 
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~~ existential dysp?oria that Kazantzakis . felt t?war?s the idea~ of 
ltarutional morality as Imposed by the Platomc punficat10n of pass10ns 
ifjrough the participation in the. d~vine, by. the ~toic ataraxia as detachment 
from all passions or by the Christian mort1ficat10n of the flesh as expressed 
iii a life imitating Jesus. 
:. His statement leads directly to a question that has not been adequately 
~t with by scholars in regard to Kazantzakis' moral problema~ic. It see~s 
~ his challenging ideas about the phenomenon of hfe and h1s unsettlu~g 
~~sion of spirituality have kept the attention of schol:rrs ~wa~ fr~m h1s 
1etwcal theory proper, or even from the study of the eth1cal 1mphcat1ons of 
1Us thought. Yet his aesthetic quest through a number of literary genres ~d 
fi: variety of media presupposes an attempt to construct the most appropnate 
~tegy of representation for framing his specific understanding of a moral 
~Vision of life. His novels in particular might give a vague articulation of ?is 
ethical perspective and the way that Kazantzakis understood the meanmg 
:of life (or even more, the meaning of the "good" life), but for reasons of 
iuamatic economy and emotional tension the writer abstains from 
establishing a hierarchy of moral values: in the novel Christ Recrucified, 
;ibe angelic and otherworldly figure of Manolios negates dominant morality 
'by self-sacrifice whereas Panayiotaros, the embodiment of absolute evil 
;and of purposeless wrong-doing, also negates prevailing social customs by 
doing completely the opposite: both are juxtaposed in a manner ~hat 
·eomplements and fulfils each other. The negative can thus be seen agamst 
'the background of goodness: the grey area of motivation cannot be judged 
on the basis of what is done or achieved but on what precedes or follows 
action. The moral element in evil motives and actions can be found in the 
. fact that they are a reaction to the existence of goodness. Panayiotaros 
wants to kill Manolios because he struggles with his own suppressed 
-goodness: tormented by shame and divided by guilt he has to destroy the 
··reason for his inner dichotomy. 
If ethics, however, represent the translation into concepts of a specific 
way of understanding existence, relations between humans and ultimately 
the relationship between humans and nature, Kazantzakis always had much 
to say in exploring the various forms of human conduct and human 
intentionality. The vexed question of how acts relate to intentions and how 
intentions manifest the introspective conscience of the specific person 
seems to have tormented Kazantzakis' mind, especially in his novels and in 
many occasions in his long epic poem The Odyssey. In his epic poem 
especially, Kazantzakis does not seem to make any connection between 
facts and values. On the contrary, it seems as though facts are totally 
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devoid of values and stand apart in phenomenological neutrality. His epic 
poem represents the confronting phantasmagoria of negative dialectics; 
what is negated (moral action and quest for the good) emerges as the 
ultimate purpose of the quest without this being stated in any way. It is on 
the basis of negations that the realm of truth is constructed: ''for you know 
well that life is but a game of scales" (Kazantzakis, 1958: 738). The plunge 
into negativity restores human equilibrium: the potential for good can be 
understood and experienced only through the exposure to evil; therein lies 
the problem of choice. 
In his literary works, furthermore, Kazantzakis give the impression of . 
being an amoralistic Nietzschean over-man, who toys with moral ideas and 
then rejects them when they become useless and somehow irrelevant to the 
changing conditions around his heroes. This strategy is extremely pertinent 
to his understanding of the issue of ethical values. Yet in all these cases, we 
must see such a perception of morality as a consequence of the quest for 
the appropriate form of self-articulation, a quest which also relates to the 
way Kazantzakis wanted to construct his complete moral theory. It seems 
that his main concern was to avoid any kind of normative deontological or 
regulative moral principles which did not emanate from actual experience 
and did not reflect the specificity of the person and the situation in which 
they occur. Such dedication and respect towards the specific gives 
Kazantzakis' overall moral theory an open-ended, pragmatic directionality, 
which never veers off to the pitfalls of relativism on one side or absolutism 
on the other. 
For artistic purposes in his novels and his poem, Kazantzakis avoided 
articulating a coherent form of ethical theory which could easily slip into 
monumental didacticism. On the contrary, his works never begin with a 
moral or even psychological presupposition; through their multilayered 
structures, they seem to explore possibilities for acting and potentialities of 
intentions, so much so that they look somehow chaotic and highly flawed 
from a moral point of view. The multiplicity of behaviours and his 
curiously impartial approach to the question of judging acts and intentions, 
coupled with the destructive morals of his Odyssey, may give the wrong 
impression that Kazantzakis' moral theory was a mish-mash of unrelated 
notions that have not been able to be unified into a coherent perception of 
the world. For this reason, we have to go back to his Ascetics (or The 
Saviors of God: Spiritual Exercises, as they have been translated) in order 
to detect the over-arching understanding of morality and discover the locus 
from which he viewed ethical issues. 
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· His Ascetics bear the dual legacy of the word in Greek; first, the 
physical exercises of athletes in classical world and then the spiritualisation 
:of its meaning through the Stoic-Christian moral vision of life. For 
.f{azantzakis, the physical tends towards its moral self re-creation: from the 
jfioment it gains consciousness of its being, through its realisation of its 
place in nature, society and history, it achieves fulfilment only to the extent 
ibat it translates itself into a moral valuation of life. The natural yearns for 
moral transformation; it tends towards transforming its originary 
1imitations into a reality of active relations that in many occasions remain 
beyond its own understanding. The fact that people behave morally doesn't 
mean that they know they do - even less, that they have to know it, and less 
still that they will be able to rationally reflect on their goodness. Morality 
for Kazantzakis exists not as a pre-existing set of values but in the active 
unfolding of innumerable potentialities through creative or destructive 
engagement with the real. Morality emerges during the exploration of 
reality as the pre-conscious recognition ofthe common human destiny. 
Historically, his understanding of morality is the product of a deep crisis 
in the concepts of value, subjectivity and society. Such a crisis was 
looming already from the end of the 191h century, when the teachings of 
Charles Darwin started gaining momentum and gradually filtered through 
to the public sphere by re-interpreting the essential humanity of human 
beings. The Darwinian impact was considerable on Kazantzakis' thought 
(he translated an abridged version of the Origin of Species in 1912) and 
was to remain deep until the end of his life. The moral implications of 
Darwin are deep and have somehow re-written the way that moral 
philosophy articulates its values. If for Aristotle and Immanuel Kant 
morality mainly referred to the virtues of citizens or duties of rational 
beings, after Darwin moral behaviour was directly associated with the 
"naturality" of humans: "virtue" was the built-in tendency towards mutual 
aid and solidarity that made society possible. What is moral is everything 
that makes society feasible and viable: sociality creates the sacred 
dimension and so the moral is an intrinsic value of the natural. The impact 
·of Darwinian theories on moral reflections led to a fresh understanding of 
human solidarity with the natural and animal world, and as a matter of fact 
incorporated human history and conscience to the general "evolution" of 
life on the planet, creating the "species" or "planetary" conscience that 
permeates environmental ethics today. 
Henry Bergson's Creative Evolution added a new layer of signification, 
problematising Darwin's dangerous idea with regards to ethics with the 
idea that humans could become autonomous from the limitations of their 
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nature and could transform their natural potential into action not 
determined by their "naturality". Creative evolution meant conscious 
intervention and active self-definition for modem ethical reflection. By 
being creative, humans detach themselves from natural constraints and 
reposition themselves within the natural environment by changing it. The 
source of the creativity that leads to autonomy is another question which 
not only Kazantzakis but his whole generation tried to solve by employing 
Nietzsche's overman ideal. His life-long passion for Nietzsche's 
ubermensch has given the wrong impression about the essence of his 
characters or even about the intention of his ideas. But it gives a very good 
idea about his moral psychology as theory of human action and of its 
intention. Both in Nietzsche and Bergson, Kazantzakis found a theory 
about human will, a theory of voluntarism that acts intentionally or un-
intentionally to change the environment, confront it own fears and fmally 
posit the ultimate questions of purpose and death. Yet the question of death 
and dying is spectacularly absent from his moral theory. Both in Leo 
Tolstoy and Martin Heidegger, morality deals with the question of death, or 
is understood under the perspective of being-towards-death, but for 
Kazantzakis death does not have moral content. Death for him is fulfilment 
and completion, the culmination of life's purpose, which does not have a 
cognitive and therefore a ethical content. 
Finally, one can detect in the presuppositions of his moral theory an 
early presence which has not been analysed or even discussed: that of 
William James' ethical pragmatism. In 1911, Kazantzakis translated James' 
Theory of Emotions (a chapter from his Principles of Psychology) and 
pragmatist ideas can be detected indirectly throughout his work. Peter Bien 
in an incisive comment locates the influence of James' pragmatism in his 
"distrust of a priori reasoning" (Bien, 1989: 24). For James "the essence of 
good is simply to satisfY demand. The demand may be for anything under 
the sun. There is really no more ground for supposing that all our demands 
can be accounted for by one universal underlying kind of motive that there 
is ground for supposing that all physical phenomena are cases of a single 
law. The elementary forces in ethics are probably as plural as those of 
physics are. The various ideals have no common character apart from the 
fact that they are ideals". (James, 1962: 201). 
So the inability to refer to a single unifYing principle for ethical 
reasoning was strengthened by the voluntaristic idea behind moral action. 
Since will is highly idiosyncratic and therefore unpredictable, the 
traditional belief in the intelligibility ofthe self receded under a new vision 
of selfhood. Kazantzakis' moral perspective begins not with the Socratic 
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~derstanding of ethics as self-knowledge but in a controversial manner as 
:the existential need for self-alienation. The ego does not posses a nuclear 
'~cture which evolves or unfolds its potentialities in acts of self-
;expression becoming thus knowable. But in the pre-Socratic times, 
:Heraclitus' belief "sot~11<1UJ..l11V SJ..tsrou't6v" ("I looked for myself' or "in 
Utyself') took no'; a new axiomatic urgency: th~ se.lf in its. full. em.ergence 
.as consciousness 1s the end result of a trans-obJective mot10n m tlme. By 
moving through space, the self intemalises its existence as knowledge 
between chronotypes. As Bender and Wellbery who coined the term 
observed: "Chronotypes are models or patterns through which time 
:assumes practical or conceptual significance. Time is not given but 
:fabricated in an ongoing process. [ ... ] Chronotypes are not produced ex 
nihilo; they are improvised from an already existing repertoire of cultural 
fonns and natural phenomena". (Bender & Wellbery, 1991: 4). Such 
cultural forms give to the self to potential for its self-imagining; through 
-cultural representations it locates its presence and incorporates its existence 
:into a ongoing process of significations through creativity; so it reaches the 
ultimate secret of self-understanding which does not belong to the lived 
·world of the self. 
Kazantzakis' final statement in the book about the "great, sublime and 
·terrifying secret: that even this one does not exist!" (Kazantzakis, 131) 
. culminates the unfolding of the self when it confronts its own end. As 
.· Wittgenstein has said "Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived 
'through" (Wittgenstein, 1958: 185). This explains the absence of death as 
moralising (or demoralising) agent in his moral theory. E.B. Greenwood's 
:·statement about Tolstoy can be also said for Kazantzakis: "death is terrible 
to those who have never really learned how to live" (Greenwood, 1975: 
. 121). So his ascetics is not a memento mori and do not offer an ars 
'moriendi; on the contrary the essence of life can be found in the banality of 
living the everydayness of existence. Thinking is not a study of dying but 
. the knowledge of living: by eliminating death from the centre of moral 
reflection Kazantzakis raised the crucial question about the eschatology of 
existence: the meaning of life is found in the actual experience of living, it 
is not a reflection over that experience and it is not a verbal translation of it. 
· For Kazantzakis death is an indecipherable secret because it is not beyond 
our experience and therefore we haven't articulated the terms of its 
formulation or answerability. 
Unquestionably this is a very interesting almost confronting moral 
vision of living. It has also created a lot of misunderstandings about 
Kazantzakis "amoralism" as so discreetly but persistently hinted upon by 
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his most faithful and most reserved disciple in Greece, Pandelis Prevelakis. 
Yet even amongst his best friends Kazantzakis' moral vision has been 
obscured by his dazzling cosmology and anthropology so much so that his 
ethics as such has been disregarded on the basis of the very obvious 
antinomian and somehow subversive characters of its stipulations. But are 
passions so negative as usually understood by traditional moral reflection? 
Aren't in their manifestation corporeal responses to the surrounding 
objective world of others? And even more that that, aren't they in their 
internalised form essential constituents of our self? How can we distinguish 
between passions if their "moral" content essentially depends on what 
happens around us? 
For Kazantzakis the passions are not simple feelings appearing against 
reason as a Humean understanding of morals would have claimed; passions 
are the building blocks of being one-self which acquire meaning and value 
as movements towards exploring the realm of otherness. By exploring with 
is not the self, then the self emerges as self-understanding of limitation and 
potentiality. In Kazantzakis moral universe the Humean "Ought" does not 
exist deontologically but it happens naturally; unfolding passions construct 
mental maps of self-recognition. Morality is not an Archimedean point 
outside my position or situation; on the contrary it is the translation of the 
limitations of existence into terms of self-performance as societal presence. 
So instead of viewing passions as negativity, Kazantzakis presents them 
as the voluntary movement of being towards its own finality. Their moral 
"essence" can be found in the will itself because the will as conscious 
choice implies responsibility and risk. So passions, in the wide range of 
emotions implied through this word, express the will to act as limitation. 
By showing our limits passions position the self not as an expansive and 
self-interested ego in pursuit of pleasure and satisfaction. Passions are not 
about pleasure because many of them cause discomfort and distress; 
passions also are not vices because in all their forms they manifest our 
existential truth. So Kazantzakis' passions are not the Kantian "reign of 
ends" or even they don't lead to "the happiness of virtue". In more 
elementary forms they are not even hedonistic indulgences or acts of 
transcendental justification. For Kazantzakis passions in all their forms 
delineate the fallibility of existence as personal affirmation. So moral 
action means bringing the others into yourself, into the inner self of 
conscious being; by bringing them in the unconscious, the prime abyss, 
according to Kazantzakis, is populated and flesh out with forms. Through 
them I can recognise its existence and can make representations of its 
presence. 
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~The Dark Abyss of our origin and of our end becomes lucid as the 
·.· sentations of others construct words and images in order to situate our 
ence between them. So, the limits of my existence generate the desire 
cend them; this desire can happen only through the recognition of 
·other as the symbol of my limitations and at the same time as the 
gnition of my liminal position. Kazantzakis insists to "give a soul to a 
hine" and searches constantly for the "impassionment" of the inanimate 
i$l(orld of objects around us. His bergsonian origins have in many occasions 
~ed this belief by translating into a vitalist understanding of life. But 
~ him passions indicate existen~e an? t?er~fore self-consciousness .. Se~f­
~ciousness means understandmg hmttatwns, the corporeal self m Its 
~city. It also means positive self-alienation: at the moment I recognise 
~self I use language to ~ocate my. pr~s~nce. This pri~al wo~d objectifies 
~y existence: langu~ge hnks the tndlVldual to the l_Ife-contm~~- Only 
~en this incorporation happens, the I can unfold Its potentiahties and 
~ .. ~ise its presence. 
~:: Kazantzakis expresses a moral organicism, in a manner similar to A.N. 
:WWtehead's process philosophy. Darren Middleton has studied the 
·'theological implications of his organicism stressing the dynamic and active 
::perception of the godhead: "For Kazantzakis and Whitehead, the divine is 
~••aetive" through the taking into Godself all that occurs in the evolutionary 
:&dvance, being "moved" in the emotional pole of divine becoming by our 
~treativity, and by ubiquitously seeking to evoke our attachment to life. Our 
·Knowledge of this help us to appreciate the value of striving for those 
$pecial values -creativity, passion, spiritual ascension- congruous with 
god's character" (Middleton, 2000: 32). Morally the creative motion itself 
becomes passion for communication and relatedness. Passions therefore are 
not unruly and irrational, dark and destructive expressions of the 
unmasterable unconscious in our mind. But forceful expressions of the 
existential desire to become your self, be realising the potential in you. 
Kazantzakis lived in the era of Andre Gide's acte gratuite as an 
expression of the quest for spontaneity. This idea can be found behind 
Kazantzakis' final virtue of freedom. Yet Gide's idea of a spontaneous act 
of self-expression has been expressed in his books as later in Albert 
Camus' The Stranger with inexplicable acts of self-gratification, even 
curious mythologisations of aesthetised murder. For Kazantzakis 
spontaneous action means quest for freedom: freedom to go beyond the 
immediate vital desires of the body to those "values" that situate individual 
presence in history and nature: "The identification of ourselves with the 
Universe begets the two superior virtues of our ethics: responsibility and 
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sacrifice" (Kazantzakis, 1960: 115). So virtues in ethics do not express a 
normative "oughtness" which imposes duties and obligations on us. Moral 
action is a condition of being one-self and therefore of self-definition: by 
acting the individual sacrifices itself because there is only action-for 
something and by going towards something the end itself changes my 
existence. Yet what about the level of intentions? Can we act morally from 
immoral intentions? Says Kazantzakis: "we leave our door open to sin. We 
do not plug up our ears with wax that we may not listen to the Sirens" 
(Kazantzakis 1960: 117). 
This would definitely cause an incredible social panic on which the 
whole of the modem societies are based on: how can we surrender to 
sinning without our society collapsing into moral chaos and into the 
antinomian ethics of "anything goes"? Is Kazantzakis' "virtue" ethics 
amoralistic in its essence? Or is it an abstract exercise in unrealistic 
possibilities beyond the provenance of history and of historical 
consciousness as such? If we leave the doors of existence open to hamartia 
isn't then possible that hamartia will lead to false perception of our being, 
to a perception which will eventually create an endless fissure within the 
individual, culminating thus to the self-frustrating egotism of possessive 
individualism? Or maybe couldn't even excessive virtue become a tragic 
flaw in an Aristotelian way delivering thus the individual to the 
uncontrollable forces of its own contingency and ultimately abolishing its 
will to create? 
Kazantzakis' belief that hamartia is something that happens and must 
happen is an extremely challenging parameter of his moral system. Yet can 
we extract an "ought" from the very simple "is", of what happens? Since 
we are exposed to the aggressive forces that decentre our existence from a 
meaningful end (imagined or real), how can we invite for such disruption 
and detraction? Isn't Kazantzakis claiming that sin (hamartia) is 
meaningful only if I have a pre-existing goal for my life? Otherwise is it 
possible that he meant that only through suffering and pain, by the constant 
detachment of the self from a collective goal to something individually 
beneficial can the self understand its position in history and act 
accordingly? And finally what about the hamartia actualised: is it expressed 
as evil or wrongdoing and therefore in return implies guilt, repentance, 
atonement? When I leave my door open to sin, do I open the door of guilt 
or shame in my conscience too? 
The question of course can be re-articulated in order to understand what 
Kazantzakis meant with hamartia; if we understand this then we will able 
to enter into the logic of his passions as ethicising factors. In traditional 
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,Christian ethics, (Stoic in their essence and origin) passions lead to 
hamartia; but passions (pathe) mean emotions which differ from 
~''impulses" (hormes). But emotions (passions) "include a characterisation 
of their objects as good or bad" (Brennan, 2003: 269). The act of 
committing a sin deliberately implies deeper pre-emotions, according to the 
Stoics (propatheiai), which are innately human and generate the need for 
;reasonable action: by inviting sin I become aware of my fallibility and thus 
· 1 choose to do what is appropriate under the circumstances and 
commensurate to my ability to know. In an interesting conclusion Brennan 
states that according to the Stoic ethical strategies "we are responsible for 
our actions because they spring from our impulses (that is, our assents and 
these are determined by our character (that is, our disposition to assent)" 
(Brennan, 2003: 294). 
Opening the door to sin means bringing my character to the public 
sphere: there my individual morality finds a place within the social 
condition of time and place. By acting according to my character, I act 
well: sin has a paideutic function. By guiding people to goodness, Hamartia 
leads to self-realisation which for Kazantzakis can only be "responsibility 
and sacrifice". In a manner completely opposite to Paul's in his Letter to 
the Romans, hamartia shows the validity of the moral law by making the 
individual cognizant of its responsibility and sacrifice. Paul stresses that 
"Once, when there was no Law, I was alive; but when the commandment 
came, sin came to life and I died: the commandment was meant to lead me 
to life but it turned out to mean death for me, because sin took advantage of 
the commandment to mislead me and so sin, through that commandment, 
killed me" (7: 9-11). So for him hamartia means conscious naturality: by 
verbalising my natural existence I dissociate myself from myself. By 
sinning I become someone other; sinning means "othering". For 
Kazantzakis by sinning I bring some one other into myself: I create a 
commandment that presupposes mutuality. So this "natural" expression of 
iny being creates a new morality which is "natural" that is according to my 
nature. "All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is 
.dominated by an instinct of life" as Nietzsche declared (Nietzsche, 1990: 
55). 
It is true that the central problem of ethics in the last two centuries is 
focused on the constant attempt to convince about its credibility and maybe 
about its applicability in a way that would transcend the specifics of 
cultural conditioning. Since it is rather impossible to aspire to the 
universality of Kant's categorical imperative or take for granted Rousseau' 
belief in the essential goodness of human nature, ethics has tried hard to 
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find a frame of reference which is not legalistic or relativistic. Even 
Heidegger's mitsein is the ground for an ethical theory and not the solid 
foundation of a form of theorising that would be inclusive of diverse 
moralities without reducing everything to situational and therefore ad hoc 
subjectivism. 
Kazantzakis posited the problem of plurality as the central question of 
his moral problematic. Hamartia in this respect means also multiplicity of 
potential action, and of potential fallibility. "I open the door to sin" means I 
open myself to the unexpected; not by doing the moralistically scandalous 
or by imagining the ethically impractical but by yielding to the experience 
of sacrifice that exposes myself to its finality; the creative appropriation of 
life empowers humans to confront mortality. This is not pessimism or even 
more so nihilism; we can't employ such concepts in order to understand the 
"horizontal ethics" ofKazantzakis. In the same manner for Kazantzakis the 
opposite of hamartia is not virtue, arete, precisely as the opposite of good is 
not evil. The mistake of traditional metaphysics and its concomitant ethics 
to ontologically equate good and evil has led to the Manichean belief that if 
you are not doing good then you necessarily do evil. The ontological 
equation between good and evil implies their essential similarity and 
interchangeability. For Kazantzakis the opposite of good is the not-good-
yet: "evil" needs purification, as Simone Weil has stated. The "road of 
evil" is the extension of the "road of virtue": Kazantzakis' polarities are 
born from within each other. They do not represent antithetic forces but 
synthetic tensions. Evil does not have an ontological existence; as in the 
Christian tradition evil is a parhypostasis, a derivative existent, incomplete 
good; it mediates for the moment of self-awareness. This is the ultimate 
expression of human fallibility: they do "evil" as misrecognition of the 
place in society and history. The Socratic dictum "no one is willingly evil" 
has to be extended to include the specific location of the individual. The 
other mistake of traditional metaphysics was because of their intellectual, 
their virtue or of religious enlightenment individuals are able to distinguish 
between intentions and results. 
But according to Kazantzakis this is rather impossible: "these two 
armies, the dark and the light, the armies of life and death, collide eternally. 
The visible signs of this collision are, for us, plants, animals, men" 
(Kazantzakis 1960:119). This means that the position of humans in history 
is somehow volatile and that humans are not passive spectators of cosmic 
forces in collision or conflicting passions in their soul. For him, humans are 
"go-betweens", who move erratically backwards and forwards in an 
attempt to achieve balance with their environment and establish their inner 
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~quilibrium. As Simone Weil, a thinker very akin to Kazantzakis, observed: 
"The essence of created things is to be intermediaries. They are 
intermediaries leading from one to the other and there is no end to this. 
They are intermediaries leading to God. We have to experience them as 
such" (Weil, 1963: 132). This is the ultimate experience for Kazantzakis, 
and the fmal secret of human life. The intermediary position expresses their 
[)pen-ended ethical responsibility, the condition of living in the grey area of 
fallibility which prepares them for good even through the realm of non-
existence, the realm of "evil" deeds and intentions. But for Kazantzakis the 
intermediary position of humans gives them the possibility to experience 
their freedom and their responsibility; only through freedom humans can be 
good and act accordingly. Freedom then is not liberation from passions but 
the discovery of the end of passions; by reaching these limits of my 
existence I can choose my action as a gesture of receiving the other in me, 
or of giving myself to the other. The horizontal ethics of reciprocity is 
behind Kazantzakis challenging injunction. 
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